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[1199] 
The Profound Political but Elusive Legal Legacy of 
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s LGBT Decisions 
MATTHEW COLES† 
This talk focuses on Anthony Kennedy’s legacy as a Justice in the LGBT 
cases that he wrote for the Supreme Court. There are four cases in which the 
Supreme Court recognized important constitutional rights for LGBT people; 
they were all written by Anthony Kennedy. Those decisions are part of one of 
the great social movements for change of modern times. Because they’re part of 
that movement, they represent a powerful political and social legacy. But a 
jurisprudential legacy . . . not so much. 
There’s the Romer v. Evans case in 1996 in which the Court said that the 
people of Colorado could not take away government’s power to pass laws 
protecting LGBT people from discrimination.1 In the Lawrence v. Texas case in 
2003, the Court said that Texas could not make certain forms of intimate 
sexuality a crime if the participants are a same-sex couple.2 There’s United 
States v. Windsor in 2013, in which the Court struck down as unconstitutional 
the so-called Defense of Marriage Act.3 In that Act, the federal government said 
even if your state thinks you’re married, we don’t for all federal purposes if 
you’re a same-sex couple.4 Finally, in the 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges 
the Court ruled that states had to allow same-sex couples to marry.5  
First, let’s look at the political legacy. 
Romer halted a national effort by the right wing to essentially derail the 
political LGBT movement.6 The point of the effort was to amend state 
constitutions to make sure that LGBT people could not get political change 
 
 † Professor of Practice, U.C. Hastings; J.D., U.C. Hastings, B.A. Yale University. Mr. Coles is the former 
Deputy National Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, and from 1995 until 2010 he was 
Director of its LGBT Project. This Essay is based on remarks delivered at the Hastings Law Journal’s 
Symposium, which focused on the jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy. 
 1. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
 2. 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
 3. 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 4. Id. at 769–70. 
 5. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015). 
 6. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24, 626 (holding that Amendment 2—the Colorado constitutional 
amendment at issue, which would have prohibited “all legislative, executive or judicial action” to protect LGBT 
persons—violated the Equal Protection Clause because the amendment was based on the desire to harm LGBT 
persons). 
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through state legislatures, state executive branches, or state courts. Romer 
stopped the campaign to strip government of the power to respond to the LGBT 
political movement dead. That was of major importance to a movement that, 
given the Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,7 was largely a politically-
focused movement. 
In context though, by the time Romer came down there had been two more 
state initiatives and we’d beaten both of them, including one in Idaho.8 And 
lower courts, by and large, blew the Romer case off. There are far too many 
opinions explaining why Romer is only about its specific facts.9 As the Eleventh 
Circuit once famously said, “Romer is no employment case.”10 
Doesn’t a case that says that a state can’t change its constitution to fence a 
group out of the usual political process speak with a breadth greater than a 
garden variety employment case? Not to most federal courts that looked at it 
afterwards.11  
The next important case in Justice Kennedy’s (and the Court’s) LGBT 
cannon is Lawrence v. Texas.12 Lawrence got the monkey of Bowers v. 
Hardwick13 off our back. 
Bowers v. Hardwick quickly evolved from a case about the Due Process 
Clause of the federal Constitution to a case that answered almost every 
constitutional question that came up about gay people. Equal protection for 
LGBT people? “No, see Bowers v. Hardwick.”14 First Amendment, “No, see 
Bowers v. Hardwick.”15 We were just waiting for the contract case involving 
lesbians in which the courts would say “unenforceable, Bowers v. Hardwick.” 
Taking that monkey off our back was a critical important step, but the 
significance of Lawrence was certainly diminished by what I think was the most 
effective dissenting opinion written in the second half of the twentieth century—
Antonin Scalia’s masterpiece in Lawrence.16 In that dissent, Justice Scalia did 
two remarkable things. First, he convinced lower courts that the correct way to 
 
 7. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 8. David Dunlap, Gay Politicians Cite Gains amid Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1994, at B9; Idaho 
Initiative History: Initiative 1, IDAHO SECRETARY ST.: ELECTION DIVISION (Nov. 8, 1994), 
https://sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/inithist.htm; Initiative, Referendum and Recall, OR. SECRETARY ST., 
https://sos.oregon.gov/blue-book/Documents/elections/initiative.pdf (last visited May 13, 2019). 
 9. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th Cir. 2004); 
Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 295 (6th Cir. 1997); State v. Limon, 
83 P.3d 229, 240 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005). 
 10. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 11. For a notable exception occasioned by a near incomprehensible attempt to argue Romer away, see 
Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 12. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 13. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 14. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990), 
implied overruling recognized by SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 15. See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 692 (D.C. Cir 1994) (en banc). 
 16. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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understand Lawrence was found not in anything said in the majority opinion, 
but rather in his dissent, which despite the majority opinion’s plain “balancing” 
of personal liberty against state endorsed morality, branded it “an unheard-of 
form of rational-basis review,” one “so out of accord with our jurisprudence” as 
to be unjustifiable under either American constitutional law or the jurisprudence 
of “any society we know.17 
For the first few years after Lawrence, most lower courts treated it as sui 
generis and inapplicable to anything but its own facts because they saw it as a 
completely unjustifiable rational basis case and for this, they cite Justice Scalia’s 
dissent.18 Amazing.  
Even more important from a political standpoint, Justice Scalia’s dissent 
effectively turns what could have been a moment to celebrate that LGBT people 
are not necessarily criminals anymore, into a dire warning that marriage for 
same-sex couples is the inevitable next step.  
“Do not believe it,” Justice Scalia warns, when the majority opinion says 
Lawrence does not address whether government has to allow same-sex couples 
to marry.19 That call to arms to those opposed to any form of equality for LGBT 
people helped fuel a political campaign aimed at preemptively stopping 
marriage. That campaign wound up burying us with twenty-six state 
constitutional amendments in the next three election cycles, amendments that 
took away all governmental power to recognize same-sex couples.20 To be that 
effective politically and that effective judicially, the dissent it seems to me walks 
away with both the political and judicial honors in Lawrence v. Texas. 
United States v. Windsor is a hugely important case because it set off a rash 
of district court, and circuit court decisions saying that states had to let same-sex 
couples marry.21 Those decisions came fast and furious after Windsor, and their 
momentum, I think, led to Obergefell, the decision requiring the states to allow 
same-sex couples to marry, much sooner than it might have come without 
them.22 There is some reason to think that is not what the Court wanted to do. In 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, a companion to Windsor in which the issue was whether 
the Constitution required states to allow same-sex couples to marry, Justice 
Kennedy famously expressed reservations about deciding the issue, given that it 
was a new phenomenon.23 Perhaps tellingly, the last sentence of Windsor, 
 
 17. Id. at 586, 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 18. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 51 n.5 (1st Cir. 2008), Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 857 
(8th Cir. 2006); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2005); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children 
& Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 19. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 20. See Haeyoun Park, Gay Marriage State by State: From a Few States to the Whole Nation, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/04/us/gay-marriage-state-by-state.html (last visited May 13, 
2019).  
 21. See 570 U.S. 744, 752 (2013). 
 22. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 23. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–49, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (No. 12-144). 
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reminiscent of Bush v. Gore,24 says that “[t]his opinion and its holdings are 
confined to those lawful marriages” (referring to marriages of same-sex couples 
recognized by state law).25  
Then there is Obergefell itself.26 Look, the truth is that those of us who 
were involved in advocacy for marriage at the time, we had about run the table 
on states where the legislatures or state courts still had the power to provide 
marriage for same-sex couples.27 We were thus looking at a seven to fifteen year 
fight to take down those state constitutional amendments that took away state 
power to allow same-sex couples to marry, at first by getting them repealed at 
the ballot box, and then perhaps with Romer-like court decisions invalidating 
them, waiting at some point for the Supreme Court to step in and bring whatever 
states remained into line. By stepping in when it did, the Court greatly truncated 
what would have been a bloody, ugly, expensive, long battle. Had Obergefell 
resulted in a huge blow-back, one could argue about whether that battle should 
have been avoided or not. I think looking at the way things have played out—
that U.S. society has largely accepted marriage by same-sex couples—the 
decision did us a great favor. 
Particularly in Obergefell, Kennedy’s LGBT opinions for the Court 
constitute an important political legacy. But to be honest, there isn’t much of a 
jurisprudential legacy here. The biggest disappointment has to be the Court’s 
failure to tell us how courts should look at laws that single LGBT people out for 
different treatment. In four cases about laws that explicitly singled LGBT people 
out for different treatment, the Court never told us. Are laws that discriminate 
presumptively constitutional subject to rational basis review? Or are they to 
some degree suspect? We just don’t know. 
Now, some people would say, “It’s a trivial problem, isn’t it? After 
Obergefell, this is really over.” I don’t think so. 
Every major civil rights movement in this Country has been met with the 
insistence by some of those who disapprove of the newly protected minority that 
they ought to have a conscience-based First Amendment right to discriminate 
and be exempted from nondiscrimination laws.28 A similar assault on laws that 
protect LGBT people from discrimination has already begun, and the favorite 
way of lawyers and judges to allow a conscience opt-out from sexuality 
nondiscrimination laws, and not to gut all of our country’s civil rights laws, is to 
say that laws that prohibit race discrimination and gender discrimination apply 
to classifications which the Supreme Court has said are inherently suspicious 
and worthy of close review. Thus, the argument goes, preventing discrimination 
 
 24. 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). 
 25. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775.  
 26. 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
 27. See Park, supra note 20. 
 28. See, e.g., Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1397–98 (4th Cir. 1990) (claimed 
religious right to pay women less); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.S.C. 1966), rev’d 
on other grounds, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (refusal to serve African-Americans at restaurant on religious grounds). 
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on those bases is compelling. Not so, the argument concludes, laws against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, since the Court has never held that 
those classifications are suspect.29 I predict this argument will be a significant 
factor, in what will be a pitched battle about whether you get conscience-based 
exemptions from nondiscrimination laws that protect LGBT people. It matters. 
There’s a similar though less obvious failure in Lawrence. It never tells us 
whether the right to form a relationship with someone of the same sex is so basic 
that states cannot use it as a basis for different treatment without an important 
purpose and a demonstration that the different treatment is needed. Though the 
Court did use the kind of balancing that is the hallmark of less deferential 
review,30 and while the Court may have had good reasons for avoiding the 
nomenclature of fundamental rights, and though the case law in the area may be 
wobbly, a clearer statement would have made Lawrence harder for lower courts 
to brush off.31 
If you look beyond what you might call a parochial LGBT view, those 
decisions are equally jurisprudentially disappointing. 
Since the ’70s, there’s been a small, but very important disagreement about 
the consequences of being able to prove that the government passed a law 
treating people differently not because of some fair notion of difference in terms 
of its purpose, but in order simply to treat the group of people in question 
differently. If you can actually prove that different treatment itself was the 
purpose, does that invalidate the law, subject it to more searching review, or can 
a law be saved by making up a rationale which we know to be false?32 
The Romer case is written in a way that circles around that question and 
completely avoids it. The Windsor case maybe suggests that you take a closer 
look when you’ve got actual proof of an improper purpose.33 As hopeful as 
Windsor was, the opinion in Trump v. Hawaii,34 an opinion which Justice 
Kennedy says in a short concurrence that he fully supports, suggests again that 
 
 29. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 32–33, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). I’ve explained elsewhere 
why this argument makes little sense. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 18 n.14, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699). Nonetheless, 
it has persistent appeal to some. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Emp't & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 404 (Ct. 
App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996). 
 30. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 31. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 51 n.5 (1st Cir. 2008), Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 857 
(8th Cir. 2006); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2005); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children 
& Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 32. For a case suggesting an improper purpose invalidates, see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433–34 
(1984). For cases suggesting a more searching review, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 
432, 450 (1985), and U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1973). For a case insisting that a 
made up rationale will save an otherwise invalid law, see Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 
370–74 (2001). 
 33. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 768, 770 (2013). 
 34. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
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a made up rationale will save a discriminatory policy at least in the context of 
the religion clauses, at least in the context of immigration.35  
The missed opportunities to answer important questions about implicit 
rights in Lawrence and Obergefell seem to me even more disappointing than the 
missed opportunity to answer equality questions in Romer and Windsor. In 
Lawrence, the plaintiffs and their friends made an important argument about 
how to understand the contours of implicitly protected rights. That argument 
said in effect, “If you’re going to use history to decide what it is that we’ve 
always more or less understood to be beyond the power of the government, you 
shouldn’t just use the history of what’s been protected from government 
interference by law. You should look at larger social and political history of what 
has been understood to be more or less off the table.”36 
So for example, the argument went, we’ve always behaved as a society that 
parents have a right to apply mild corporal discipline to their children even 
though that violates laws against assault. That tells us that parental discipline has 
always been understood to be off the table, even though the law technically said 
otherwise.37 Justice Kennedy flirts with the idea, but then drops it and doesn’t 
use it as a basis of the decision at all.38 
There was an equally important point about implicit rights that the 
Lawrence Court could have addressed: while we may use history to discover the 
contours of an implicitly-protected right, we don’t use the history of who got to 
exercise it to decide who has the right today. Prior to Bowers v. Hardwick, many 
of the important cases in which the Court found an implicit right could not have 
been decided as they were had the right been limited to those who had a historic 
right to it.39 
If you want to see a good explanation of the point, read Chief Judge Judith 
Kay’s dissenting opinion in Hernandez v. Robles.40 The Lawrence opinion never 
touches the issue. 
 
 35. Id. at 2420. I don’t think though that Trump actually settles the question. Apart from the fact that 
immigration may constitute a “special case,” the Court goes on to say, as it often does after declaiming any need 
to evidence, to cite “persuasive evidence” that the policy in fact had a legitimate basis. Id. at 2421–23. 
 36. See, e.g., Brief for Professors of History as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10–20, Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102); Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
9–16, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102); Brief for American Civil Liberties Union & ACLU of Texas as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11–26, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102). 
 37. Brief for Professors of History as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 36, at 10–20; Brief 
for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 36, at 9–16; Brief for American Civil 
Liberties Union & ACLU of Texas as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 36, at 11–26. 
 38. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568–71. Justice Scalia, recognizing the potential of the idea to expand the 
coverage of implicit rights, made sure to take it on in his dissent. See id. at 595–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 39. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
 40. 855 N.E.2d 1, 23–27 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, J., dissenting), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2015); see also Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas and the Refinement of Substantive Due Process, 16 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 42–48 (2005). 
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Perhaps the most disappointing opinion is the Obergefell opinion, at least 
in part because it aimed so high and fell so far short. For years, Justice Kennedy, 
Justice Souter and other Justices said that, while history might be a starting point 
for deciding the contours of implicit rights, it shouldn’t be the ending point.41 
We should be able, those opinions argued, to bring historical understandings 
forward into the present.42 In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy laid out four different 
inquiries that he offered as a way to do just that.43 These factors, the Justice tells 
us, will show us how to separate the essentials of the implicit right to marry from 
unimportant historical trappings.  
As much as I respect the Obergefell opinion as a political milestone, I think 
those four factors as explained in the opinion tell us mostly what Justice 
Kennedy admired about the institution of marriage. They don’t tell us a great 
deal about how to separate the essential elements of a fundamental right from 
outmoded details.  
Some think trying to come up with a principled way of using the way 
history has evolved to understand the contours of an implicit right is a lost cause. 
While not a full blown theoretical take, I highly recommend Judge Vaughn 
Walker’s decision in the California marriage case, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, in 
which he uses the legal and social evolution of the institution of marriage as a 
way to identify the essential elements of a recognized implicit fundamental 
right.44 As Judge Walker shows, while gender was an essential element of the 
legal and social institution of marriage one hundred years ago, marriage is much 
less socially gendered and no longer legally gendered at all. From that, he 
concludes that sex is not a part of the essential fundamental right.45 It’s a brilliant 
piece of work and shows that achieving a contemporary understanding of an 
implicit right identified by history is something that can be done. Obergefell 
swings for the same fences, but in my view it’s a strikeout. 
In context, and I want to put this back into context, I think these four 
opinions reflect the profound emotional commitment of a very decent human 
being to right a great historical wrong. For that moral commitment, one that 
likely overcame many of the values on which he was raised, we should respect 
and admire the man. I do. 
I am also deeply grateful for not having to have engaged in the trench 
warfare over state constitutional amendments that time has shown us was, in 
terms of national acceptance of a profound change, unnecessary.  
A legal legacy requires something else. But let’s not dwell on what it is not 
here. Let’s look instead at that profound commitment to righting a great historic 
 
 41. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 765 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 42. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72. 
 43. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584, 2598–2603. 
 44. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992–93 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 45. Id. 
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wrong and how important those four decisions were in righting it, and respect 
the man for that.  
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